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Public Financing in Developing and
Transition Countries
ROY BAHL and SALLY WALLACE

The widespread adoption of ﬁscal decentralization laws during the past 25 years
can be mostly tracked to economic efﬁciency gains and nation-building
objectives. Subnational governments (SNGs) in industrialized countries account
for about twice the share of total government expenditures as in developing
countries. Transition countries also assign more expenditure responsibilities to
SNGs than do the developing countries. There has been little growth in the SNG
expenditure or tax shares over the past three decades. We conﬁrm the basic
hypotheses that the SNG expenditure share is significantly higher in countries
with higher incomes, larger populations, and a lower degree of corruption.

INTRODUCTION
Among the developments in public ﬁnance and budgeting over the last 25 years, those in
the developing and transition countries are some of the more dramatic changes. The
political and economic shifts from planned states to new market economies and the push
for economic growth called for new tax policies, new relationships between the private
and public sector, new systems of budgeting, and new relationships among levels of
government. The focus of this paper is on the latter, intergovernmental ﬁscal relations,
with an emphasis on trends in developing and transition countries. The theory that the
decentralization of ﬁscal decisions can lead to better governance has gained great currency in the past 25 years. In the developing and transition countries, there has been
widespread adoption of ﬁscal decentralization laws. In many industrialized countries,
the interest in ﬁscal decentralization has deepened. In this review paper, we outline the
reasons for this political enthusiasm, track the progress of ﬁscal decentralization over the
past quarter century, present some empirical work that addresses the question, ‘‘Why do
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countries decentralize?’’ and discuss the reasons why this policy direction might or might
not accelerate. Our concern in this analysis is with the ﬁscal role of subnational governments (SNGs). We deﬁne SNG ﬁnances as the sum of provincial (state) and local
government taxing and spending.

WHY DECENTRALIZATION? THEORY AND RHETORIC
The appeal of ﬁscal decentralization as a policy strategy is broadly about the political
economy of governance, and about the economic and political gains and losses that can
march along with this approach to reform. Underneath this political motivation is an
underlying set of country-specific factors that make decentralization a more or less
desirable policy reform. If one is to understand the reasons why ﬁscal decentralization
has been such an important policy topic over the last quarter century, one must begin by
understanding what has moved so many countries to adopt this governance strategy. We
try and answer the question, ‘‘Why decentralization?’’ by referring ﬁrst to the underlying
theory about what the gains should be, and second to the rhetoric that has accompanied
decentralization programs in countries around the world.
The Theory
The theory of ﬁscal decentralization is drawn from economics. Most students of this
subject begin with Oates’ decentralization theorem, ‘‘in the absence of cost savings from
the centralized provision of a [local public] good and of interjurisdictional externalities,
the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efﬁcient
levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level
of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.’’1 The story is a compelling one:
local voters will be happier if they choose the level and mix of government services to be
provided. The more diverse the preferences within a country, the greater the efﬁciency
gains from assigning these functions to local governments.
In theory, revenue mobilization might also increase as a result of decentralization, for
two reasons.2 First, if the local population is successful in getting the package of service
they want, they might be more willing to pay. Second, because local governments have a
comparative advantage in assessing and collecting some taxes, overall revenue mobilization might be increased by decentralizing certain taxing powers.
The theoretical underpinnings for decentralization were developed in a context of
governance in industrialized economies. Bahl and Linn make the case that the efﬁciency
gains from ﬁscal decentralization may not be captured as fully in developing countries,
1. Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972), 54.
2. Roy Bahl and Johannes F. Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
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for several reasons. First, the absence of open elections at the local level in some countries limits the extent to which the local population can reveal its preferences for public
services.3 Second, local governments may not be able to reach desired levels of spending
or revenues because of their limited administrative abilities. Finally, there are legal constraints, i.e., local governments may not have been assigned the ‘‘right’’ expenditure
responsibilities or adequate taxing powers.
The Rhetoric4
Few countries choose to get carefully focused on the question of ‘‘Why decentralization?’’ Many countries never take the step of developing a White Paper that specifically
identiﬁes the problems that might be resolved with ﬁscal decentralization. But there is
almost always a ‘‘rhetoric’’Fdelivered in speeches, policy papers, in the press, by interest
groups, donors, and the governmentFfrom which one might tease out the underlying
reasons.
In fact the justiﬁcation varies from country to country. Various advocates will see
decentralization as primarily an economic, political, social, management, or even a military strategy. The way these national leaders see it will pretty much drive the way they
design it. This also explains why the rhetoric in support of ﬁscal decentralization is so
varied, and perhaps even why there is such a gap between the rhetoric and the real impact
of successful decentralization.
In many cases, the rationale for decentralization matches up well with the problems
that the country is facing, suggesting that ﬁscal decentralization policy is more than a
political strategy. Russia’s ﬁscal decentralization developed shortly after the breakup of
the Soviet Union and looks very much like one designed to head off separatist movements. South Africa’s movement of decision-making power to over 800 local governments is exactly what one would have expected in the aftermath of apartheid. Indonesia’s
decentralization followed the economic chaos that came with the Asian crisis, and was a
reaction to what was perceived to be overcentralization.
Many would like to believe that ﬁscal decentralization is an effective strategy for
stimulating economic development. Intuitively, the argument is reasonable. The government closest to the local or regional economy is in the best position to decide on
matters such as the best regulatory environment for local business, the right infrastructure investments to make, the proper structure of taxation, and in general, the enabling
environment best suited to develop the local economy. Lady Ursula Hicks had this in
3. Even with local elections, the introduction of decentralization policies may be more likely when the
party system is organized at the state versus the central level. See Eliza Willis, Christopher Garman, and
Stephan Haggard, ‘‘The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America,’’ Latin America Research Review 3,
no. 1 (1999): 7–55.
4. For a more detailed discussion of these same arguments for ﬁscal decentralization, see Roy Bahl and
Jorge Martinez, ‘‘Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization’’ (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 1, 2005),
especially Annex A.
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mind in her 1961 book, Development from Below, which was one of the early arguments
for stronger local government in developing countries.5 Whatever the reason, the search
for empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and economic development has not produced conclusive evidence.6 The absence of statistical proof is not
damning of the economic development argument, and may be because of the problems
with separating the impacts on economy from the impacts on everything else. In this
context, McNab develops the interesting point that the effects of decentralization on
economic development are indirect, i.e., decentralization impacts technical efﬁciency,
income inequality and corruption, which in turn affect economic growth.7
The growing number of countries with democratically elected SNGs clearly has stimulated interest in ﬁscal decentralization. Those interested in the politics of policy development might argue that this factor has been paramount in stimulating at least the
rhetoric and probably the demand for ﬁscal decentralization. And, it is not all rhetoric.
Elected politicians at the SNG level push hard for some powers to shape budgets (although they are much more enthusiastic about having power to spend than they are
about having power to tax). Even in China, provincial leaders (who are appointed by the
central government) lobby for a greater ﬂow of resources to their provinces. Tanzi makes
the same argument with respect to the centrally appointed prefets in France and Italy.8
It should be recognized that politically driven decentralization processes do not guarantee that government ﬁscal decisions will end up being made closer to the people. The
current cases of India and Spain demonstrate that most of the ﬁscal powers on the
expenditure and revenue sides of the budget can remain at the state or provincial level,
with these governments acting as centralized regimes toward their local governments.
Another important part of the rhetoric is that centralization is an inefﬁcient management approach, especially in large countries. Fiscal management, i.e., supervision of a
substantial part of the budgetary affairs of every SNG, can be costly and can lead to
poor public service outcomes when countries are very large. It can also create significant
ill will on the part of local ofﬁcials and their constituencies who feel burdened by the
central bureaucracy. A relatively few central ofﬁcials cannot make the important ﬁscal
5. Ursula K. Hicks, Development from Below: Local Government and Finance in Developing Countries of
the Commonwealth (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1961).
6. Tao Zhang and Heng-fu Zou, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization, Public Spending, and Economic Growth in
China,’’ Journal of Public Economics 67, no. 2 (1998): 221–243; Hamid Davoodi and Heng-fu Zou, ‘‘Fiscal
Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study,’’ Journal of Urban Economics 43 (1999):
244–257; Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China,’’
Economic Development and Cultural Change 49, no. 1 (2000): 1–22; Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert
M. McNab, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth,’’ World Development 31, no. 9 (2003): 1597.
7. Robert McNab, ‘‘An Empirical Examination of the Outcomes of Fiscal Decentralization.’’ (Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Economics Department,
2000).
8. Vito Tanzi, ‘‘Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efﬁciency and Macroeconomic Aspects,’’ in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995 (Washington, DC:
The World Bank, 1995): 295–316.
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decisions for every local government, on a case-by-case basis. There are just too many
complications and too many special circumstances for this to be a viable approach in
large countries. China and India have populations in excess of one billion, and China has
nearly 60,000 SNGs, while India has nearly a quarter million; Brazil has a land area
greater than 8.4 million square kilometers; Indonesia is composed of 6,000 inhabited
islands and Russia has 11 time zones. How could such countries be managed efﬁciently
from a national capital, by a relatively few senior ofﬁcials? Yet, as late as the mid-1990s,
the budget of each of the 89 regional governments in Russia was being approved in
Moscow on the basis of face-to-face negotiations. Some form of decentralized governance would seem an imperative in large countries.
The problems with centralized control are not limited to large countries. Even in small
nations, the combination of a poor transportation and communications network can
make the national capital very remote. In Nepal, for example, many of the 4,000 local
governments are several days journey from Kathmandu.
Fiscal decentralization is a strategy that sells because people want different things
from their local governments. Centralization, on the other hand, implies some degree of
uniformity in the government services delivered, and in the revenue-raising powers given
to SNGs. But there is a resentment of enforced uniformity, and various regions within
countries have pushed hard for autonomy to choose a package of services that better ﬁts
their demands. Countries with interregional variations in language (e.g., India, Sudan),
ethnic background (e.g., Indonesia, Nigeria), or climate and terrain (e.g., Russia) are
good candidates for ﬁscal decentralization. Even countries that are relatively homogenous in population mix and climate may be pressured for different service standards in
urban and rural areas, or in regions with different economic bases. Local populations
apparently can recognize the potential economic efﬁciency gains.
There has been an undercurrent of sentiment against big government in the last two
decades, and a loss in conﬁdence in the ability of the public sector to adequately and
efﬁciently serve the population. Some of this sentiment has taken the form of a push to
privatization of what heretofore had been seen as public sector activities. As Tanzi9
points out, the enthusiasm about placing greater reliance on the market has been accompanied by the parallel view that less power should be in the hands of the central
government. This sentiment has made ﬁscal decentralization an easier sell in the last two
decades.
Another explanation for the increased demand for ﬁscal decentralization in recent
years is the improved management and administrative capacity of local governments.
The rap on SNGs has always been their inability to recruit quality staff to deliver services
effectively, or to manage money. Although many of the same criticisms are leveled today,
there can be no doubt that great numbers of provincial and local governments have
‘‘grown up’’ in terms of their management and administrative capacity. Affordable microcomputer systems, improved education, and the greater relative attractiveness of
9. Tanzi, Ibid.
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employment in the SNG sector have all contributed to this. When SNGs feel ready, they
bring pressure for more ﬁscal autonomy and this is a factor contributing to the increased
demand for ﬁscal decentralization.
Once countries reach a certain threshold, decentralization policy gains a significant
amount of momentum. Local elections, improved administrative capacity, and ‘‘local
nationalism’’ can make the demand for ﬁscal decentralization irresistible. If it is not given
in a formal way, it may be taken using ‘‘backdoor’’ approaches. A good example is
Chinese local governments who were denied formal taxing powers but levied informal
(often illegal) taxes, which were kept in off-budget accounts. Local governments did take
on more ﬁscal autonomy on the revenue and the expenditure side, and this was in response
to a demand for local services that higher level governments were unwilling to fund. But
this ‘‘backdoor’’ approach brought inefﬁciencies in terms of how the funds were raised
and in terms of spending from segmented, extra budgetary accounts.10 It may be far better
to structure a program of ﬁscal autonomy than to have it taken on an ad hoc basis.
Perhaps the most compelling rhetoric has to do with service delivery. The level and
quality of local public services provided in most developing countries is appalling. ‘‘The
job is not getting done anyway, let’s try another approach’’ is an argument that gets great
deal of sympathy and support. There seems to be a feeling in some camps that more local
control over expenditure decisions can make things better. The Inter-American Development Bank,11 commenting on the policy agenda for Latin America, put it this way:
‘‘Policy makers in the region are becoming aware of the potential offered by externalities
and interdependence existing between ﬁscal decentralization, the effectiveness of social
spending, and greater local political participation.’’ There are at least intuitive arguments
to support this. SNGs are better positioned to determine the location of capital investments, they may be able to better control the performance of employees working at the
local level, and they might be better at maintaining the local public capital.
Local voters feel more likely to be ‘‘heard’’ by local politicians and bureaucrats than
by central politicians and bureaucrats. It is also true that the local population is more
aware of the decisions made by local bureaucrats than they are of decisions made by
central government ofﬁcials, and hence are more likely to hold local ofﬁcials accountable
for services provided.12 Khemani reports results for India that show local voters holding
local ofﬁcials more accountable for economic performance than they do ofﬁcials of

10. Christine P. Wong, ed., ‘‘Overview of Issues in Local Public Finance in the PRC,’’ in Financing
Local Government in the People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997); Roy
Bahl, Fiscal Policy in China: Taxation and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (San Francisco: The 1990
Institute, 1999).
11. Inter-American Development Bank, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization: The Search for Equity and Efﬁciency,’’ Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Bank, October
1994).
12. Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
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higher-level governments.13 There is, of course, the risk that decentralization will fail to
improve the level and quality of public services, but the risks associated with doing
nothing are often perceived as a worse alternative, a continuation of the dismal performance of the centralized approach to service delivery.
Finally, decentralization may be a part of the strategy to hold countries together, or of
a strategy for nation building. Some countries have been formed out of unnatural partners and have dissolved when the opportunity arose, e.g., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In some cases, the fall of strong central regimes has prompted a call to move
governance away from the central level and has stimulated ﬁscal decentralization initiatives. Indonesia, South Africa, and Russia are cases in point. Other troublesome
partnerships have played to special autonomy measures to try and hold the country
together. Nigeria, the Philippines, and Sudan fall into this category. We also may note
that even in the case of reuniﬁcations, decentralization plays an important role as in
Vietnam, Germany, and China-Hong Kong.
This survey suggests that countries express their interest in ﬁscal decentralization in
many different ways. Likely this has to do with the political selling of ﬁscal decentralization. In fact, however, most of the rhetoric about the beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentralization
can be tracked to two rationales: economic efﬁciency gains and nation building. The
decentralization theorem, it seems, is an important guide for thinking about devolving
budgetary powers to SNGs.

THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The great number of countries pursuing some form of decentralization policy indicates
the popularity of this development strategy. We turn now to a discussion of the actual
implementation of decentralization policy, as measured by ﬁscal data. As will be shown
below, the evidence about the progress is mixed.
Trends
The most commonly used comparative measure of ﬁscal decentralization is the SNG
share of total government expenditures. This measure ignores the degree of discretion
given to SNGs, but it does show the extent to which the ﬁnancing of government services
is passed through their budgets.14 Although this measure is ﬂawed as an indicator of the
13. Stuti Khemani, ‘‘Decentralization and Accountability: Are Voters More Vigilant in Local vs. National Elections?’’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2557 (2001).
14. The point that the subnational government expenditure share is a measure that overstates true ﬁscal
decentralization is developed in some detail in Robert D. Ebel and Serdar Yilmaz, ‘‘On the Measurement
and Impact of Fiscal Decentralization,’’ in Public Finance in Developing and Transitional Countries: Essays
in Honor of Richard Bird, eds. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and James Alm, Studies in Fiscal Federalism and
State-Local Finance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), 101–119.
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extent to which SNGs inﬂuence resource allocation, it is suggestive of the importance of
the SNG sector in government ﬁnance.
This expenditure decentralization ratio and an analogously deﬁned tax decentralization ratio are reported in Table 1.15 The results presented here are not surprising in
showing that SNGs in industrialized countries account for about twice the share of total
government expenditures as in developing countries. Industrialized countries are characterized by more stable economies, less regional inequality, and more developed infrastructure, and these are all factors that encourage the choice of more ﬁscal
decentralization. Transition countries assign more expenditure responsibilities to SNGs
than do the developing countries, but they give relatively little ﬁscal discretion to the
lower-level governments.
What is surprising is that on average, there has been little growth in the SNG expenditure or tax shares over the past three decades. This time pattern holds true for both
industrialized and developing countries.
Although some countries have greatly decentralized their ﬁscal structures over this
time period, the average performance suggests a quite stable level. Recent research has
shown that there has been little change, on average, in the claim of intergovernmental
transfers on the tax revenues of those higher-level governments making the transfers.16
We can say less about the decentralization of taxing powers because the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook, from which
these data are drawn, appears to misclassify transfers as local taxes in some country
cases. Deﬁnitional problems not withstanding, these data show that the SNG tax share is
about twice as high in industrialized than developing countries, and that there has been
little change in these shares in the past 30 years. These is no evidence of a significant
movement to shift the locus of taxing powers to lower-level governments.
Intercountry Variations
Why do some countries choose to decentralize their ﬁnancing structure more than others? Researchers have studied this question over the past 25 years and have reached
similar conclusions about the determinants of cross-country variations in the expenditure
decentralization ratio.
The statistical approach followed is more or less the same in all of these studies. The
dependent variable is the expenditure share of SNGs, and data on this variable are taken

15. This table is an updated version from Roy Bahl and Sally Wallace. ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization: The
Provincial-Local Dimension,’’ Public Finance in Developing and Transitional Countries: Essays in Honor of
Richard Bird: Studies in Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance, series ed. Wallace E. Oates (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003).
16. Roy Bahl and Sally Wallace, ‘‘Intergovernmental Transfers: The Vertical Sharing Dimension,’’ ISP
Working Paper No. 04-19, Atlanta, GA: International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy
Studies, Georgia State University, 2005.
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17.91 (24)
33.68 (23)

10.68 (43)
13.42 (45)

OECD
Countries

12.09 (41)

8.87 (33)

Developing
Countries

OECD
Countries

31.97 (24)

18.18 (23)

1980s

Sample sizes are given in parentheses.
SNG, subnational government; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

SNG tax as a share of total
government tax
SNG expenditure as a share
of total government
expenditure

Developing
Countries

1970s

TABLE 1
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators

12.97 (54)

10.61 (28)

Developing
Countries

32.68 (24)

18.39 (21)

OECD
Countries

1990s–2000s

30.32 (24)

22.41 (23)

Transition
Countries

from the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook.17 The independent variables are
speciﬁed to match the theoretical expectations about the determinants of expenditure
decentralization. Various studies have used cross-sections of data for a given year or an
average over a span of years, or have used panel data.18
Most of the results in previous studies square with theoretical expectations.19 The size
of a country, measured either as population or land area, seems to be a significant
determinant of the degree of expenditure decentralization. Per capita gross domestic
product (GDP), usually standing as an index of economic development is associated with
a higher level of decentralization.20 The extent to which a country is at war or is threatened by war appears to be associated with more centralization.21 Some researchers have
found that ethnic diversity drives up the level of decentralization, a result that squares
with theoretical expectations, and others have found a positive effect of urbanization.
In this analysis we update the empirical work from the newer issues of GFS, specify
the model in a slightly different way than has been done in the past, and use a more
extensive data set than has been the case in some studies. We simulate a cross-section by
using average values of these data for the period covering the 1990s to the present.
The dependent variable, as in previous studies, is the expenditure decentralization
ratio. By 2002 (the latest year for which data are available), this ratio ranged from 70
percent in China to less than 3 percent in a number of developing countries. The sample
includes 87 countries and is comprised of transition, developing, and industrialized nations. This large sample allows us to compare the determinants of decentralization
among countries with a variety of underlying differences in economic and political
institutions.
We specify ﬁve determinants of expenditure decentralization. Population size and land
area are used as independent variables to measure the size effect, and a positive association with expenditure decentralization is expected. Per capita GDP (in US$) and a
dummy variable for developing countries are used to measure the level of economic
development, with an expected positive marginal effect in each case. We use ethnic
fractionalization as an index of population heterogeneity and expect a positive relationship with expenditure decentralization.22 Transparency International’s index of corrup-

17. International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (Washington, DC: IMF,
2003).
18. Leonardo S. Letelier, ‘‘Explaining Fiscal Decentralization,’’ Public Finance Review 33, no. 2 (2005):
155–183.
19. A very good review of the literature is provided by Letelier, Ibid., 155–183.
20. Michael Wasylenko, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development,’’ Public Budgeting and
Finance 7, no. 4 (1987): 57–71; Ugo Panizza, ‘‘On the Determinants of Fiscal Centralization: Theory and
Evidence,’’ Journal of Public Economics 74, no. 1 (1999): 97.
21. Roy W. Bahl and Shyam Nath, ‘‘Public Expenditure Decentralization in Developing Countries,’’
Environmental Planning C: Government and Policy 4, no. 4 (1986): 405–418; Letelier, 155–183.
22. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Deevleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain
Wacziavg, ‘‘Fractionalization,’’ Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (2002): 155–194.
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TABLE 2
Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of the Determinants of Expenditure Decentralizationb
Equation (1)
Constant
Per capita
GDP (in US$)a
Dummy variable for less-developed countries
Populationa

2.89
(2.10)
0.21
(2.62)

Corruption
Transition country
Dummy variable
R2
N

1.30
(1.82)

0.88
(2.83)
0.32
(6.25)

Land areaa
Ethnic fractionalization

Equation (2)

0.32
(0.80)
0.43
(2.76)
1.05
(5.37)
0.47
86

0.21
(4.53)
0.05
(0.13)
0.89
(1.11)
0.19
(0.60)
0.40
87

a

In logarithms.
Expenditure decentralization is deﬁned as the subnational government share of total government expenditures.
GDP, gross domestic product.
b

tion is an independent variable with an expected negative relationship with the expenditure decentralization ratio, i.e., we expect more corruption to be associated with less
decentralization.23 We argue that decentralization is less likely to be a policy strategy in
centralized countries where corruption is entrenched. We introduce a dummy variable
for transition countries to control for differences in the functions of government.
The results of this estimation, presented in Table 2, conﬁrm the basic hypotheses
about the determinants of ﬁscal decentralization. The expenditure share is significantly
higher in countries with higher incomes, in large countries, and in countries with a lower
degree of corruption. The results are robust with respect to alternative measures of
country size or income level. We also ﬁnd that, cetera paribus, the SNG expenditure
share is higher in transition countries. Between 40 and 50 percent of the cross-country
variation can be explained.

23. Transparency International, Global Corruption Report (Berlin: Transparency International, 2005).
We calibrate the corruption index so that a larger number implies more corruption.
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THE CONSTRAINTS TO DECENTRALIZATION24
The trend of decentralization in developing and transition countries is not necessarily
what one might expect. The more-or-less constant expenditure share of SNGs in developing countries over the past three decades raises the question about why countries
have not decentralized more than they have. In fact, there are some significant constraints to ﬁscal decentralization that have held back the growth of SNG ﬁnance, and
that may continue to constrain ﬁscal decentralization. In the case of transition countries,
the limited time frame of the data does not allow us to say much about changes in the
level of decentralization. We may note, however, that the level of expenditure decentralization is much higher than that in developing countries, and is more on par with the
decentralization level in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
countries.
The economies of less-developed countries tend to be more exposed to external
shocks, e.g., movements in international ﬁnancial markets, or changes in world prices for
a primary export product or in energy prices. In such cases, central governments will
want to hold on to the major instruments of ﬁscal policy so as to have ﬂexibility in
controlling the overall level of the deficit. If SNGs play a larger role in the ﬁscal systemFas, for example, accounting for a larger share of expenditures, taxes, or borrowingFthe central government will have less ﬂexibility to deal with ﬁscal imbalance. There
is also the issue in many countries of SNGs not facing a hard budget constraint (and/or
being subjected to an overassignment of expenditure responsibilities) and passing their
deficits to higher-level governments. Brazil and Argentina are the cases most often cited
as the example of ﬁscal decentralization compromising macroeconomic stability.
This same argument could be made in transition countries, especially in the early
1990s as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. The centrally planned economies of
countries such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Armenia, and
the like were especially vulnerable after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Theoretically, we might expect that this would have led to high levels of centralization to allow
the government control of the levers of the economy. However, aside from cases such as
Latvia, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, the dismal ﬁscal condition of the central government and high level of public expenditures resulted in an off-loading of expenditure
responsibilities to the SNGs.
Some research disagree with the proposition that macroeconomic stability is a constraint to the enactment of ﬁscal decentralization program.25 If business cycles are regional, some SNGs may even be better positioned to absorb external shocks than are
24. Bahl and Linn, 385–427; Roy Bahl, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization as Development Policy,’’ Public
Budgeting and Finance 19, no. 2 (1999): 59–75; Remy Prud’homme, ‘‘On the Dangers of Decentralization,’’
World Bank Economic Review 9 (1995): 201–219; Tanzi, 295–316.
25. Paul Berndt Spahn ‘‘Decentralized Government and Macroeconomic Control,’’ Infrastructure Notes
FM-12 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997); David Sewell, ‘‘The Dangers of Decentralization According
to Prud’homme: Some Further Aspects,’’ World Bank Research Observer 11 (1996): 143–150.
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central governments. Some would go so far as to say that in certain circumstances SNGs
can play a role in stabilization policy.26
Another constraint to substantial decentralization has to do with infrastructure planning and service delivery. In developing countries the basic system is not yet in
placeFtrunk roads, power grids, ports, universities, etc.Fand this pushes infrastructure
decisions to a higher-level government, which is more capable of accommodating externalities. Moreover, there is the fear that the delivery of infrastructureFconstruction
and maintenanceFis beyond the reach of many provincial and local governments. At
least in the poorest countries, this argument supports continued centralization. Some of
this capacity did exist at the lower levels of government in centrally controlled economies
such as the Russian Federation. Therefore, this constraint to ﬁscal decentralization was
not as pronounced in many transition countries.
A third constraint is equalization. Most developing and transition countries face
greater inequalities among regions than do industrialized countries. Because they have
access to the more productive tax bases, central governments are in a better position to
accommodate these inequalities through the tax-transfer system than are SNGs. Moreover, ﬁscal decentralization, if it includes significant local government taxing powers, is
inherently counterequalizing in that it favors wealthier jurisdictions. In practice, the
counterequalizing fears associated with overassignment of taxing powers to local governments has not materialized in most countries, either because taxing powers have not
been handed down to any great extent or because compensating equalization transfers
have been introduced. In any case, central governments do not appear to have used their
ﬁscal discretion to pursue regional equalization.27 Prud’homme, however, reports on
several cases where a centralized ﬁscal system led to ﬁscal redistribution among the
regions.28
A fourth constraint is bureaucratic. Central control of ﬁnances means that line ministries are responsible for much of the portfolio of service delivery, or at least for identifying targets for spending and disbursing funds. Under a decentralized system, the
SNGs will assume this responsibility and the control of the central bureaucracy will be
dramatically reduced. Those bureaucrats, who will lose power, and perhaps even jobs,
form a powerful lobby for centralization. This pull to centralization holds for developing, transition, and industrialized countries.
It is commonly argued that ﬁscal decentralization in the form of greater expenditure
assignments to SNGs in developing countries (and more recently in the case of transition
countries) would compromise the quality of public services delivered. A number of
26. Edward Gramlich, ‘‘Federalism and Federal Budget Protection,’’ National Tax Journal 40, no. 3
(1987): 299–313.
27. For evidence on Brazil, see Teresa Ter-Minassian, ed, ‘‘Brazil,’’ Fiscal Federalism in Theory and
Practice (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997): 450–456. On the Philippines, see Richard
M. Bird and Edgard R. Rodriguez, ‘‘Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation. International Experience
and the Case of the Philippines,’’ Public Administration and Development 19 (1999): 299–319.
28. Prud’homme, 201–219.
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arguments have been made in support of this proposition:29 (a) the quality of SNG civil
servants is weak because career opportunities are more limited than at the central level;
(b) public expenditure management systems (e.g., treasury, accounting, and auditing) are
weak; and (c) opportunities for bribery and nepotism are likely to lead to waste. These
are old arguments but still powerful constraints to decentralizing policy.
A relatively new issue in this literature is the relationship between decentralization and
corruption. One school of thought is that decentralized systems are more corrupt, in part
because local politicians are more susceptible to pressures from local interest groups.30 If
local voters are not sophisticated enough to hold local ofﬁcials accountable, corruption
will go unchecked. This suspicion may be more perception than reality. Tumennasan
argues that the greater accountability of local government ofﬁcials and interjurisdictional
competition are deterrents to corruption, and estimates a negative relationship between
decentralization and corruption.31 Fisman and Gatti32 and Gurgur and Shah33 reach a
similar conclusion. Nevertheless, the fear that decentralization breeds more corruption is
often enough to cause countries to hold on to centralized ﬁscal systems.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Fiscal decentralization has become entrenched as a part of development strategy in much
of the world. Transition countries have adopted decentralization as a natural part of the
switch from planned to market-based economic systems. With only rare exceptions is
ﬁscal decentralization abandoned once it gains some momentum. However, as we point
out in this paper, it has stalled in developing and developed countries in the last quarter
of this century, and it has stalled at the very time that the hype has been greatest. By the
early 2000s, the average share of government expenditures made by SNGs was about the
same as in the 1970s in developing countries. The same may be said for industrialized
countries, but the level is about twice as high. The share in many transition countries,
while exploding in the 1990s, has also plateaued.34
What might the future hold? Are there factors at work that suggest that SNG ﬁscal
shares will now begin to increase? Or to fall? Of course, futures are not predictable, and

29. Tanzi, 295–316, Prud’homme, 201–219.
30. Ibid., 201–219.
31. Bayar Tumennessan, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption in the Public Sector’’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Economics Department,
2005).
32. Raymond Fisman and Roberta Gatti, ‘‘Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries,’’ Journal of Public Economics 83 (2002): 325–345.
33. Tugrul Gurgur and Anwar Shah. ‘‘Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?’’
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3486 (2001).
34. We emphasize that these are averages and hide the cases of some countries where there were
significant increases and others where the subnational government ﬁscal share fell.

96

Public Budgeting & Finance / Silver Anniversary Edition 2005

one cannot see with any degree of certainty the major changes in attitudes toward
governance that are coming. However, one could argue persuasively that the next quarter century will not see changes of the magnitude of the last quarter century: e.g., the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the end of apartheid, or the replacement in many countries
of long-time central government domination with democratic governance. As ﬁscal decentralization is often driven by big events such as these, we might speculate that major
impetuses for enhanced provincial and local government ﬁnance will not be on the scene.
On the other hand, there probably will be significant international ﬁnancial disruptions,
China and India’s continued emergence on the world economy will have ripple effects,
and many countries will remain in the throes of internal strife. And, as has been discussed
in this paper, all of these factors provide an impetus for various types of ﬁscal federalism
reforms and for more ﬁscal decentralization.
There are factors that might suggest a continued stall, and hold some countries from
decentralizing further. Continued struggles with ﬁscal balance may cause some central
governments to continue to exercise caution in committing large vertical shares to SNGs.
Trade liberalization and international competition will limit tax-policy choices, and
pressures to maintain budget balance will continue to argue for reducing subsidies of all
kinds. Social needs and infrastructure needs might continue to crowd out decentralization, by raising its opportunity cost. In other words, there could be more pressure than
before for central governments to hold on to their revenue collections. This pressure will
be especially great in the poorest countries.
On the other hand, there are ﬁve factors that suggest an increase in the ﬁnancing share
of SNGs. First, the issue itself will not go away. Most of the reasons why countries argue
a decentralization strategy, as surveyed in this paper, go back to the issue of economic
efﬁciency gains, i.e., getting government ﬁscal decisions closer to the people. Higher-level
governments have been responding to the call by SNGs for more say about the tax and
expenditure decisions that affect them. Moreover, there is evidence of concern about
whether the electoral processes for local ofﬁcials give local constituencies enough voice.
Second, the ‘‘determinants’’ analysis carried out in this paper and that from earlier
studies suggests that ﬁscal decentralization is a strategy that goes hand in hand with
economic development. As income rises, so does the share of ﬁscal activity managed by
SNGs. As the GDP gap between the rich and the poor countries closes, so will the ﬁscal
decentralization gap.
A third reason to expect increases in the ﬁscal share of lower-level governments is the
possibility that more taxing powers will be passed down, particularly to those SNGs with
the administrative wherewithal to administer a tax system. This increased provincial and
local taxing power could roll out into increased spending by these governments as locals
reacted to their newfound power to tax and choose their expenditure mix. Fourth, SNGs
have increased their capacity to both deliver services and administer certain types of taxes.
With a current groundswell of reaction against big government, central governments
might be more willing to pass at least more spending responsibility to state and local
governments and ‘‘get them on the learning curve’’ with respect to delivering local services.
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Finally, there is the issue of the ﬂypaper effect with respect to central government
taxes, i.e., central government taxes have ‘‘stuck where they hit.’’ The rate of central
revenue mobilization increased in many countries, but the rate of pass through to lower
level governments did not. Much of the increase in the revenue mobilization of the past
quarter century, particularly that in emerging economies, has been because of the introduction of the VAT and to ensuing rate increases in the VAT. These revenues were
guarded by most central governments, and until recently, the VAT was thought of as
unsuitable as a provincial-level tax. Central governments in most countries were wary of
committing a large share of this revenue bonanza to SNGs.35 The next round of VAT
adjustments will more likely be base broadening and administrative cleanup, and there
may be less hesitance to pass a guaranteed share of revenues through to SNGs.

35. There were exceptions to this general rule, and some countries have earmarked a percent of valueadded tax (VAT) collections for revenue sharing with lower-level governments.
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